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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
SPREADER SPECIALISTS, INC., 
Petitioner, 
vs. 
No. 21037 
PUBLIC SERVICE COMMISSION OF 
UTAH; BRENT H. CAMERON, Chairman; 
JAMES M. BYRNE, Commissioner; 
BRIAN T. STEWART, Commissioner, 
Respondents. 
BRIEF OF PROTESTANT W. S. HATCH COMPANY 
STATEMENT OF ISSUE PRESENTED ON APPEAL 
Is the Utah Public Service Commission's denial of peti-
tioner's application for operating authority so clearly 
unreasonable or irrational that it must be deemed arbitrary and 
capricious? 
DETERMINATIVE STATUTORY PROVISIONS 
Utah Code Ann. S 54-7-16 (1973): 
. . . [Supreme Court] review shall not be extended 
further than to determine whether the commission has 
regularly pursued its authority, including a determi-
nation of whether the order or decision under review 
violates any right of the petitioner under the Consti-
tution of the United States or of the state of Utah. 
The findings and conclusions of the commission on 
questions of fact shall be final and shall not be sub-
ject to review. Such questions of fact shall include 
ultimate facts and the findings and conclusions of the 
commission on reasonableness and discrimination. . . . 
Utah Code Ann. § 54-6-5 (1973): 
. . . If the commission finds from the evidence that 
the public convenience and necessity require the pro-
posed service or any part thereof it may issue the 
certificate as prayed for, or issue it for the partial 
exercise only of the privilege sought, and may attach 
to the exercise of the right granted by such certifi-
cate such terms and conditions as in its judgment the 
public convenience and necessity may require, other-
wise such certificate shall be denied. Before grant-
ing a certificate to a common motor carrier, the 
commission shall take into consideration the financial 
ability of the applicant to properly perform the ser-
vice sought under the certificate and also the charac-
ter of the highway over which said common motor car-
rier proposes to operate and the effect thereon, and 
upon the traveling public using the same, and also the 
existing transportation facilities in the territory 
proposed to be served. If the commission finds that 
the applicant is financially unable to properly per-
form the service sought under the certificate, or that 
the highway over which he proposes to operate is 
already sufficiently burdened with traffic, or that 
the granting of the certificate applied for will be 
detrimental to the best interests of the people of the 
state of Utah, the commission shall not grant such 
certificate. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Nature of the Case 
This is a petition for review of a decision of the Utah 
Public Service Commission denying petitioner's application for 
authority to operate as a motor carrier of certain liquid 
petroleum and liquid petroleum products in intrastate commerce. 
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Course of Proceedings Below 
Following nine days of evidentiary hearing, the commission 
on April 12, 1985 issued its findings of fact and conclusions 
of law denying petitioner's application. (R. 1487-1505.) 
Petitioner moved for reconsideration. (R. 1508-27.) The com-
mission denied the motion for reconsideration on November 5, 
1985. (R. 1691-94.) The petition for review was filed 
December 4, 1985. (R. 1699-1700.) 
Statement of Facts 
Spreader Specialists ("Spreader") seeks authority to oper-
ate "as a common carrier for the transportation of liquid 
petroleum and liquid petroleum products (except propane and 
butane), in bulk, in tank vehicles over irregular routes from 
and between all points in the State of Utah." (R. 1488-89.) 
Four companies hold operating authority which conflicts with 
that requested by Spreader: W. S. Hatch Company; Mat lack, 
Inc.; Clark Tank Lines, Inc.; and Energy Express, Inc. Each of 
those companies protested Spreader's application. (R. 1370-74, 
1381-83, 1378-80, 1375-77.) Several other protests were filed, 
but were withdrawn after amendment of Spreader's petition to 
eliminate conflict with those other protestants* operating 
authorities. (R. 1384-1401.) 
Following nine days of evidentiary hearing, and extensive 
briefing, the commission made detailed findings of fact and 
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conclusions of law. (R. 1487-1505.) Essentially, the commis-
sion concluded that Spreader was financially fit, although 
marginally so (R. 1491-92, 1502), but that the existing car-
riers were providing adequate service, were experiencing excess 
equipment capacity and would be financially impaired if the 
requested authority were granted. (R. 1496-98, 1501-02.) 
W. S. Hatch Company ("Hatch") submits that the statement of 
facts in Spreader's brief is inconsistent with the evidence and 
with the facts as found by the commission, and therefore sub-
mits its own statement of the facts, with particular emphasis 
on those facts which are either omitted from Spreader's brief 
or which Hatch maintains Spreader has stated in a manner con-
trary to the commission's findings. 
Spreader sought authority to render four distinct types of 
service: 1) transportation of liquid asphalt, 2) distribution 
of liquid asphalt at job sites, 3) transportation of crude 
petroleum from well sites to refineries, and 4) transportation 
of refined products from refineries to customers. (R. 1490.) 
The authority sought directly conflicted with Hatch's operating 
authority or business in the first three categories and in sub-
stantial areas of the fourth category. (R. 1372.) 
The evidence showed that the asphalt transportation business 
in Utah is highly seasonal, with peak demand occurring in July, 
August and September, and virtually all asphalt transportation 
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occurring between the months of May and October. (R. 1490-91.) 
This seasonal Mboom and bust" cycle creates a substantial 
financial hardship on carriers, who must maintain expensive 
equipment adequate for the transportation and spreading task 
throughout the year, even though such equipment is only used 
during the summer months. (R. 1491.) The crude and distillate 
petroleum transportation businesses are less seasonal, but are 
secondary to Spreader's primary asphalt business. (R. 1493.) 
The commission's denial of the requested authority was not, 
as Spreader claims, based solely on the financial harm the 
commission found would be caused to existing carriers. Rather, 
the commission went through an extensive analysis of all rele-
vant factors. The commission found that the existing transpor-
tation service was adequate for the current market and for 
expected future growth. (R. 1498-99.) Each of the protesting 
carriers had experienced significant excess equipment capacity, 
and the commission found that granting authority to Spreader 
would likely only exacerbate that condition. (R. 1498.) Fur-
ther, the commission found that the existing rate structure was 
competitive, and that Spreader did not propose to charge a rate 
lower than the current market rate. (R. 1496.) 
Finally, the commission found that each of the protesting 
carriers, although efficiently operated (R. 1500-01, 1692), was 
operating at a loss or with minimum profits, with a substantial 
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portion of their revenues potentially divertable by Spreader if 
the requested authority were granted. (R. 1497-98.) The com-
mission expressed concern that existing carriers might be 
forced to cut corners on safety and maintenance expenses 
(R. 1501), and that further financial impairment of existing 
carriers might precipitate closure or curtailment of services 
to remote locations within the state, which Spreader did not 
propose to service. (R. 1501.) 
Based on those conclusions, the commission found that the 
existing services were adequate, and that approval of Spreader's 
application would only worsen an already difficult situation. 
The commission concluded: 
Were the Utah operations of the existing carriers 
financially sounder, or were we convinced Applicant's 
entry into the market would offer the shipping public 
real benefit, we would be inclined to grant the appli-
cation. However, on this record, we conclude the 
application must be denied. (R. 1503.) 
Following denial of its application, Spreader moved for 
reconsideration, claiming that the commission's decision was 
based solely on the financial harm to other carriers. 
(R. 1508-27.) The commission denied the motion, reasoning that 
the appropriate analysis requires a balancing of all relevant 
factors, and specifically rejected Spreader's request that the 
commission adopt a presumption in favor of applicants that 
increased competition necessarily serves the public interest. 
-6-
(R. 1691-94.) The commission reasoned that, while competitive 
benefits were a factor to be considered, they were outweighed 
in this case by the detrimental results such additional compe-
tition would create. (R. 1692.) 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
I. Review of decisions of the Public Service Commission 
is extremely limited. Decisions of the commission must be 
affirmed so long as the commission has regularly pursued its 
authority. 
A. Review of the commission's basic fact-findings in 
this case is limited to determination of whether there is evi-
dence "of any substance whatever" supporting the decision. If 
the record discloses such evidence, the finding of fact must be 
affirmed. 
B. The commission's determination of the public 
convenience and necessity is a decision of executive policy, 
not a judicial decision, and must be upheld so long as it falls 
within the limits of reasonableness or rationality. 
II. The commission went through an extensive analysis of 
all of the factors bearing upon the public convenience and 
necessity in this case, and under the applicable standard of 
review, the commission's resolution of the issues against 
Spreader must be affirmed. 
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A. The case of Big K Corp. v. Public Service Commis-
sion, 689 P.2d 1349 (Utah 1984), does not represent a departure 
from prior decisions of this court. Big K only requires that 
the commission not give excessive weight to any single factor, 
to the exclusion of other important factors, when determining 
the issue of public convenience and necessity. So long as the 
commission takes into consideration all of the relevant fac-
tors, its decision falls within the bounds of its discretion 
and must be upheld. 
B. The commission in this case carefully and cor-
rectly analyzed all of the factors mandated by statute, by the 
Big K case and by prior case law. 
1. The commission determined that the benefits 
to be derived from additional competition did not justify 
granting of the application. It specifically found that cur-
rent rates were low and competitive, and that Spreader did not 
propose to service territories not already served. 
2. The commission further determined that 
existing transportation facilities were adequate and responsive 
to the needs of shippers. In this regard, it found that exist-
ing carriers had ample equipment and had in fact experienced 
substantial idle equipment problems. The commission's determi-
nation of this issue was consisted with its statutory duty to 
prevent duplication of services. 
-8-
3. Finally, the commission determined that, in 
contrast to the minimal benefit to be derived from competition, 
the potential detrimental effect of competition was substan-
tial. It determined that additional competition would finan-
cially impair existing carriers, thus posing safety risks and a 
risk of deterioration in service to the public. 
C. The Big K case creates no evidentiary presumption 
based upon increased competition. Instead, it emphasizes that 
competition is one of many factors to be taken into account in 
the analysis, and that competition might be a positive or nega-
tive factor. This position is consistent with prior case law. 
III. The commission's findings of basic fact in this case 
are supported by substantial evidence. Under the applicable 
standard of review, which provides that such fact-findings must 
stand if they are supported by evidence Hof any substance what-
ever," the findings must be affirmed. 
A. For purposes of the factual analysis, the ser-
vices Spreader provides under its lease of equipment to Matlack 
must be considered to be services of Matlack. 
B. The commission's determination that existing 
transportation facilities are adequate was supported by sub-
stantial evidence. When the concessions Spreader's witnesses 
made on cross examination are taken into account, the evidence 
reveals that some shippers have expressed a general desire for 
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additional carriers, but that Spreader has not borne its burden 
of proving by specific, affirmative evidence that there is a 
genuine inadequacy in the level of existing services. 
C. The Commission's finding that projected growth 
did not justify granting of authority to an additional carrier 
was also supported by substantial evidence. The evidence was 
that the intrastate asphalt business has declined substan-
tially, and that the other relevant transportation demands are 
increasing at a very modest rate. The commission's determina-
tion that the existing carriers could and should handle any 
increase in demand is within its exclusive policy-making 
authority. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
APPELLATE REVIEW OF DECISIONS OF THE PUBLIC 
SERVICE COMMISSION IS STRICTLY LIMITED, AND 
THIS COURT SHOULD NOT DISTURB THE COMMIS-
SION'S DECISION IN THIS CASE. 
This court's review of rulings of the Public Service Com-
mission is strictly limited. The statute under which this 
court reviews commission decisions provides: 
[Supreme Court] review shall not be extended further 
than to determine whether the commission has regularly 
pursued its authority, including a determination of 
whether the order or decision under review violates 
any right of the petitioner under the Constitution of 
the United States or of the state of Utah. The find-
ings and conclusions of the commission on questions of 
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fact shall be final and shall not be subject to 
review. Such questions of fact shall include ultimate 
facts and the findings and conclusions of the com-
mission on reasonableness and discrimination. 
Utah Code Ann. § 54-7-16 (1973). 
While this court has not applied the statutory provision 
literally, it is nevertheless clear that decisions of the PSC 
on questions of fact and ultimate fact are accorded great 
weight. With regard to pure fact-findings, the court has held: 
The standard of review that affirms Commission 
findings on questions of basic fact if they are sup-
ported by "evidence of any substance whatever" and 
sets them aside only if they are "without foundation 
in fact" is the standard this Court will follow in 
reviewing the Commission's findings of basic facts in 
this case. 
Utah Department of Administrative Services v. Public Service 
Commission ("Wexpro II"), 658 P.2d 601, 609 (Utah 1983) (empha-
sis added). 
With regard to findings of ultimate fact, such as the 
determination of public convenience and necessity in the case 
at bar, the court has recognized that the commission's deci-
sions should be accorded great weight, both because the com-
mission has special expertise in dealing with the subject mat-
ter and because the determination of public convenience and 
necessity is a policy decision which the legislature has dele-
gated to the commission. This court in Wexpro II stated the 
applicable standard of review as follows: 
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The degree of deference extended to the decisions 
of the Commission on these intermediate types of 
issues has been given various expressions, but all are 
variations of the idea that the Commission's decisions 
must fall within the limits of reasonableness or 
rationality. As used in this context, the words 
"arbitrary and capricious" mean no more than this. 
658 P.2d at 610. 
Hatch submits that the issues presented in the case at bar 
fall within the limitations outlined above. Spreader first 
contends that the commission has misapplied the decision of Big 
K Corp. v. Public Service Commission, 689 P.2d 1349 (Utah 
1984). This aspect of Spreader's argument falls within the 
second level of review specified above: The commission's find-
ing that the public convenience and necessity will not be 
served by the granting of Spreader's application is a finding 
of ultimate fact which can only be disturbed if it falls out-
side the limits of rationality so that it must be deemed arbi-
trary and capricious. Wexpro II, 658 P.2d at 610. See PBI 
Freight Service v. Public Service Commission, 598 P.2d 1352, 
1354-55 (Utah 1979). The commission considered numerous rele-
vant factors in reaching its result, and not just the potential 
financial harm to the protestants, and the commission's finding 
therefore is not subject to challenge. This portion of 
Spreader's argument will be dealt with in Point II of this 
brief. 
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Spreader spends much of its brief arguing the credibility 
of the evidence, yet the commission reviewed the evidence, saw 
the witnesses and heard their testimony, and on that basis 
resolved the issues of basic fact in this case against 
Spreader. Those issues include the nonexistence of any 
deficiency in the existing services, the lack of anticipated 
growth in the limited markets to be served, the determination 
that existing services are adequate and responsive, the deter-
mination that existing fleets are underutilized and the finding 
of probable financial harm to the protestants if the authority 
were to be granted. Those findings of the commission are, as 
will be shown in Point III of this brief, supported by substan-
tial evidence and are therefore not subject to challenge. 
POINT II 
THE COMMISSION PROPERLY ANALYZED ALL THE 
RELEVANT FACTORS IN CONCLUDING THAT THE PUB-
LIC CONVENIENCE AND NECESSITY WOULD BEST BE 
SERVED BY DENIAL OF SPREADER'S APPLICATION. 
The primary thrust of Spreader's argument on appeal is that 
the commission failed to analyze the relevant factors in 
reaching its conclusion that the public convenience and neces-
sity would not be served by granting Spreader's application. 
Specifically, Spreader asserts that the commission based its 
decision primarily on a finding of financial harm to existing 
carriers, and that the commission should have presumed certain 
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public benefits to flow from the addition of another competitor 
to the relevant market. Contrary to Spreader's assertion, the 
commission properly weighed and considered all the relevant 
factors, including both the benefit and detriment to be derived 
from further competition, in reaching its decision. 
A. The Commission Acts Within the Bounds of Its 
Discretion When It Considers and Weighs the 
Numerous Factors Bearing Upon Public Con-
venience and Necessity. 
Under the standard of review set forth in the Wexpro II 
case, the findings of the commission on questions of ultimate 
fact are to be upheld if they fall within the limits of "rea-
sonableness and rationality." 658 P.2d at 610. The finding of 
public convenience and necessity is such a finding of ultimate 
fact, because it is both a policy decision and a conclusion to 
be drawn from the evidence. PBI Freight Service v. Public 
Service Commission, 598 P.2d 1352, 1354-55 (Utah 1979). As the 
court stated in an early transportation case: 
Issuing a certificate of convenience and necessity is 
an act of the executive department of state govern-
ment, and when done pursuant to law is not subject to 
judicial annulment. . . . What policy should be pur-
sued, or what conclusions should be drawn from dis-
puted facts is not a law question for the judiciary to 
decide. Such questions must be determined by the per-
son or body whose action depends upon the determina-
tion thereof. 
Mulcahy v. Public Service Commission, 101 Utah 245, 117 P.2d 
298, 300 (1941). In this case, the commission went through a 
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comprehensive analysis of all factors bearing upon the issue 
before it, and its decision must therefore stand. 
Spreader argues that the commission misapplied the standard 
set forth in Big K Corp. v. Public Service Commission, 689 P.2d 
1349 (Utah 1984). The Big K case involved an application by a 
trucking company (Big K) for authority to transport drilling 
fluids between points within Utah. The commission held that 
Big K had failed to demonstrate that existing service was 
deficient, on the apparent basis that no shipper was completely 
deprived of service. This court reversed, holding 1) that the 
commission should have considered other factors, including the 
benefit or detriment that would ensue from addition of another 
competitor in the market, and 2) that the evidence established 
a deficiency of service. The finding of a deficiency of ser-
vice was based on evidence that Big K proposed to open termi-
nals in parts of the state not otherwise locally served, thus 
reducing travel time and cost of service. 
In Big K, this court reaffirmed its earlier decisions hold-
ing that the determination of public convenience and necessity 
depends upon an analysis of numerous factors. This is not a 
judicially created analysis, but rather is a statutory require-
ment. Utah Code Ann. § 54-6-5 (1973) (quoted on page 2 of this 
brief). The Big K court held that one factor should not be 
singled out and given extraordinary weight. Specifically, the 
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court held that the benefits and detriments of additional com-
petition were important factors to be considered. 689 P.2d at 
1354. The court also noted that inadequacy of current service 
and the potential for growth in demand for services should be 
considered in appropriate cases, Id. at 1355. 
Big K does not represent a departure from this court's 
prior decisions in transportation cases. Instead, it rep-
resents a reaffirmation of prior decisions holding that the 
commission should not give excessive weight to any single 
factor, to the exclusion of other important factors, when 
determining the issue of public convenience and necessity. In 
Big K, the commission had given excessive weight to the defi-
ciency of service standard, and had disregarded other factors 
bearing upon the public convenience and necessity, including 
the benefits to be derived from competition in that case. The 
court simply reaffirmed that the determination of public con-
venience and necessity depends upon an interworking of several 
factors• 
Review of other cases confirms this. Although in other 
cases the court has emphasized various single factors, that 
individual emphasis has been the result of the court's belief 
that the commission had ignored the particular factor under 
discussion in each case. In Lake Shore Motor Coach Lines, Inc. 
v. Bennett, 8 Utah 2d 293, 333 P.2d 1061 (1958), for example, a 
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leading Utah transportation decision, the court reversed an 
order of the commission granting a certificate of public con-
venience and necessity to an applicant carrier. The commission 
had based its finding of public convenience and necessity upon 
a general showing that shippers would like more choices among 
available carriers. The court ruled that the applicant was 
required to make a specific, affirmative showing of inadequacy 
or lack of existing service before the application could be 
granted. The commission had unduly emphasized shipper demands, 
and had improperly de-emphasized the adequacy of existing ser-
vice. 
The case of PBI Freight Service v. Public Service Commis-
sion, 598 P.2d 1352 (Utah 1979), provides an example of the 
court's review of a correct decision of the public service 
commission. In that case, the commission granted the applicant 
authority to carry gypsum products from Sevier County to all 
points within Utah. The court affirmed the commission because 
the commission had considered all the relevant factors in 
reaching its conclusion that the public convenience and neces-
sity would be served. Specifically, the commission had found 
that the addition of a new carrier would result in an improve-
ment in service; that it would result in a decrease in mileage 
charges, including "dead-head" (empty) mileage charges; that it 
was uncertain whether existing carriers could manage the burden 
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of an anticipated increase in shipments; and that the addi-
tional traffic over congested roads was not excessive. The 
court found that the commission's analysis was adequate and was 
supported by competent evidence, and therefore affirmed. 
As will be shown below, the commission in the case at bar 
carefully analyzed all of the relevant factors, and its find-
ings were supported by competent evidence. Accordingly, the 
order of the commission should be affirmed. 
B. The Commission in This Case Carefully and 
Correctly Analyzed All of the Factors Speci-
fied in the Big K Case and Its Predecessors. 
In the case at bar, the commission carefully analyzed all 
of the factors mandated by the Big K case and its predeces-
sors. The commission first looked at the potential benefits 
the addition of another competitor might have upon the subject 
market. The commission noted that Spreader did not propose to 
charge a rate lower than that currently being charged in the 
market, and further noted that current rates were so low that 
at least one shipper was cutting back on its own proprietary 
fleet operations, and making greater use of certificated car-
riers, because of the competitive rates charged by the four 
certificated carriers. (R. 1496.) Thus, the commission found 
no price benefit to be derived from additional competition. 
The commission also analyzed the competition factor with 
regard to the efficient use of equipment, finding that each of 
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the existing carriers possessed and operated adequate spreader 
equipment, and that each had experienced excess spreading and 
transportation equipment capacity. (R. 1498.) The commission 
then determined that the projected level of growth in demand 
did not justify the granting of the application. (R. 1499.) 
These determinations were consistent with the commission's 
statutory duty, which provides that the commission shall regu-
late all common carriers "so as to prevent unnecessary duplica-
tion of service." Utah Code Ann. § 54-6-4 (Supp. 1985). 
As required by Big K, the commission also examined the ade-
quacy of existing facilities, within the confines of the rule 
that the applicant bears the burden of proving by specific evi-
dence that existing facilities are inadequate. Lake Shore 
Motor Coach Lines, Inc. v. Bennett, 8 Utah 2d 293, 333 P.2d 
1061, 1063 (1958). In Big K, the court made clear that, 
although the adequacy of existing facilities was in part an 
aspect of the competition factor, it was also an independent 
factor in the analysis, and that the applicant bore the burden 
of proving that existing facilities are inadequate. 689 P.2d 
at 1355. 
In the case at bar, the commission determined that the 
level of existing service was "adequate and responsive to the 
reasonable demands put on it." (R. 1500.) The only complaint 
about existing spreader service that the commission found to be 
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supported by substantial evidence was the inability to obtain 
spreading trucks on short notice during the busy season, 
(R. 1494.) The commission found, however, that seven of the 
nine witnesses making that complaint had not attempted to use 
all of the carriers presently available to them. (R. 1494.) 
It further found that all of the existing carriers had excess 
equipment capacity. (R. 1498.) 
With regard to transportation of light distillates (e.g., 
gasoline, jet fuel, etc.), the commission found that existing 
service was also adequate. One witness had complained of con-
sistently late deliveries, but the commission found that the 
witness had been taking advantage of a special low rate which 
provided for delivery at the carrier's convenience. (R. 1494.) 
The other witness complained of delivery and loading problems, 
but the commission found that the failure rate immediately 
prior to the hearing was less than two percent. (R. 1494.) 
Several witnesses testified with regard to crude oil 
transportation. One had experienced no problems, and was only 
concerned with having as wide a choice among carriers as pos-
sible. (R. 1494.) Another witness complained of a lack of 
willingness by carriers to install certain hand rails on their 
trucks, but the commission found that installation of the rails 
would make it impossible for the carriers to load or unload 
their trucks at other customers1 facilities. (R. 1494-95.) 
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The only other witness with regard to crude oil complained of 
an inability to get trucks on short notice, especially on week-
ends. (R. 1495-96.) The commission found that the existing 
carriers had tried to be cooperative with this witness, but 
that the only way to satisfy the witness' demand would be for 
the carriers to have idle equipment and drivers on hand waiting 
for a call that might or might not come. (R. 1496.) The com-
mission determined that option to require an unacceptable level 
of idle equipment. (Id.) 
Having found that the benefits to be derived from addi-
tional competition were minimal or non-existent, the commission 
turned to analysis of the potential detriments which would 
result from addition of another carrier. Under Big K, that 
analysis was to be done in terms of financial harm to existing 
carriers. Although financial harm alone is insufficient basis 
for denial of an application, the Big K case held that finan-
cial harm could form the basis for denial of the application if 
it undermined the ability of existing carriers to provide reli-
able service, comply with safety regulations or conform with 
other applicable regulations. 689 P.2d at 1354. 
Spreader argues that the commission relied almost exclu-
sively on the financial ground in denying the application. The 
commission, however, recognized that Big K requires a balancing 
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of the financial factor against the other applicable factors. 
The commission stated in its order in this case: 
[T]he Court [in Big K] established a balancing test 
for the grant of authority, in which the public bene-
fits to be anticipated from increased competition are 
important factors for us to consider, but are not per 
se dispositive. Against the prospective benefits must 
be weighed the prospective detriment. One facet of 
that detriment would be the impairment of the ability 
of efficiently-run carriers to maintain their service 
at existing levels of performance and safety. 
(R. 1692.) 
In the instant case, the commission found that the financial 
harm posed the risks this court outlined in Big K. The commis-
sion found that all of the existing carriers, except Matlack, 
were financially weak. (R. 1496-98, 1501.) Although Spreader 
argues that the financial harm to the existing carriers was 
minor, the commission found, in the case of Hatch, that $1.12 
million of business annually was potentially divertible if the 
application were granted. (R. 1498.) Similar findings were 
made with respect to the other carriers. (R. 1497-98.) The 
commission found that the financial harm posed the dangers 
outlined in Big K: 
While we are loathe to conclude Applicant's entry into 
the market would so financially impair the existing 
carriers that they would find themselves under pres-
sure to cut corners on safety requirements, we cannot 
blind ourselves to economic realities and the real 
possibility of such occurring. 
We must also consider that particularly the mar-
kets relevant here involve transportation to remote 
parts of the state. It would be unfortunate indeed if 
-22-
Applicant's entry into the market precipitated the 
closure of any of the existing carriers' terminals or 
the curtailment of their operations into those areas. 
Indeed this risk of deterioration of service into 
remote parts of the state strongly distinguishes this 
case from that presented in Big K in which the appli-
cant proposed to open a terminal in an area not then 
served by such a facility. 
As our Findings above recognize, we cannot quan-
tify the likely diversion of revenue from any one car-
rier. However, since all four have experienced losses 
in their Utah intrastate operations, there is a sub-
stantial danger we are dealing with the straw capable 
of breaking the camel's back. With little or no off-
setting benefit in prospect, we choose not to run that 
risk. (R. 1501-02.) 
Spreader also argues that the commission failed to consider 
whether existing carriers are efficiently operated. Spreader, 
however, in contending that existing carriers are not effi-
ciently operated, bore the burden of proof as part of its show-
ing that its application would serve the public convenience and 
necessity. See Big K, 689 P.2d at 1354-55; Lake Shore Motor 
Coach Lines, Inc. v. Bennett, 8 Utah 2d 293, 333 P.2d 1061, 
1063; Mulcahy v. Public Service Commission, 101 Utah 245, 117 
P.2d 293, 305 (1941). All parties presented evidence on this 
point, and Spreader cross examined the protesting carriers at 
great length on their operations and financial results. The 
commission implicitly resolved the issue against Spreader. 
(R. 1500-1501, 1692.) Among the supporting evidence was the 
testimony of a customer who had reduced use of its own pro-
prietary fleet because the services of the certificated car-
riers were "quite competitive." (R. 439-42.) 
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The commission's analysis of the factors going into its 
conclusion that the public convenience and necessity would not 
be served by granting of the application is precisely the 
analysis this court mandated in Big K. The analysis is not 
unreasonable or irrational, and thus, under the standard of 
review set forth in Wexpro II, should not be disturbed. The 
commission has made a policy decision supported by a well-
reasoned and substantial analysis; it would be an improper 
intrusion into the statutory process for this court to compel 
the commission to reach a different policy decision. 
C. The Mere Fact that Granting of the Certifi-
cate Will Increase Competition Does Not 
Require that the Commission Approve the 
Application. 
Spreader argues that the commission should have presumed 
certain benefits to flow from the addition of a new competitor 
into the market it proposed to serve, and that such benefits 
require a finding that the public convenience and necessity 
will be served by granting the application. The prior deci-
sions of this court, including the Big K case, make clear that 
competition should be considered, but that it may be either a 
positive or negative factor in the analysis. In the case at 
bar, the commission properly concluded that competition was a 
negative, rather than positive, factor. 
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In Big K, the court placed a great deal of emphasis on the 
competition factor in finding that the commission had not com-
pleted the proper analysis when it denied Big K's application. 
The court recognized, however, that the policy of the Motor 
Carrier Act was to do away with unrestrained competition, and 
replace it with an analysis of competition and other factors as 
they bear upon the ultimate question of public convenience and 
necessity, 689 P.2d at 1355. The emphasis on competition in 
Big K is merely a reflection of the court's finding that the 
commission in the Big K PSC proceeding had failed to take that 
factor into account in its analysis. The court made clear that 
competition can be either an affirmative or negative factor in 
the analysis. The requirement was only that competition be 
considered. The court stated: 
In determining whether the public interest and 
necessity are served by additional service, the Com-
mission must consider numerous factors. It must weigh 
the benefits to be derived from increased competition, 
such as the potential beneficial effect upon rates, 
customer service, the acquisition of equipment more 
suitable to customer needs, the efficient use of 
equipment, greater responsiveness in meeting future 
shipper needs, and greater efficiency in the use of 
route structures and interlining arrangements. 
Of course, the Commission may not wholly dis-
regard the effect that additional competition may have 
on existing carriers. The Commission must not under-
cut the ability of efficiently operated carriers to 
achieve sufficient financial stability so that they 
can provide reliable service, comply with public 
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safety regulations, and conform with other business 
regulatory policies that further economic development 
and the growth of new industries. 
689 P.2d at 1354 (citations omitted). 
Although the court stated that competition was usually an 
affirmative factor in the equation, it stopped short of creat-
ing any presumption based on competition: 
Except where market conditions require otherwise, such 
as where markets are too small to support an addi-
tional carrier, or a new carrier seeks to "cream" a 
market to the detriment of other carriers or small 
shippers, competition is almost always an affirmative 
factor in furthering the public convenience and neces-
sity. 
Id. at 1355. 
This reasoning is consistent with the court's previous dis-
cussions of the competition factor. In Lake Shore Motor Coach 
Lines, Inc. v. Bennett, 8 Utah 2d 293, 333 P.2d 1061 (1958), 
the applicant had relied on a general assertion of the benefits 
to be derived from competition. The court found that the 
applicant's showing was inadequate, and that in order to pre-
vail, the applicant was required to demonstrate the benefits to 
be derived from competition by specific, affirmative evidence. 
333 P.2d at 1064. The court stated: 
Proving that public convenience and necessity would be 
served by granting additional carrier authority means 
something more than showing the mere generality that 
some members of the public would like and on occasion 
use such type of transportation service. . . . Our 
understanding of the statute is that there should be a 
showing that existing services are in some measure 
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inadequate, or that public need as to the potential of 
business is such that there is some reasonable basis 
in the evidence to believe that public convenience and 
necessity justify the additional proposed service. 
For the rule to be otherwise would ignore the pro-
visions of the statute; and also would make meaning-
less the holding of formal hearings to make such 
determinations and render futile efforts of existing 
carriers to defend their operating rights. 
Id. at 1063 (footnote omitted). 
The court in Big K relied extensively on Lake Shore in its 
analysis. Reading Big K and Lake Shore together makes clear 
that Spreader's reliance in this case on the benefits to be 
derived from competition is misplaced. The commission con-
sidered those benefits, but found that competition in this case 
would have undesirable negative consequences, both to the other 
carriers and to the public at large. Because the commission 
appropriately weighed the competition factor, its conclusion 
that competition is not in the public interest is not "irra-
tional" or "unreasonable", Wexpro II, and should not be dis-
turbed. 
POINT III 
THE COMMISSION'S FINDINGS OF FACT ARE SUP-
PORTED BY SUBSTANTIAL EVIDENCE AND SHOULD BE 
AFFIRMED. 
Spreader devotes much of its brief to argument over the 
credibility of the evidence supporting the commission's find-
ings of basic fact. Under the standard reaffirmed in Wexpro 
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II, such pure fact-findings of the commission must stand if 
they are supported by evidence of any substance whatsoever. 
658 P.2d at 609. In the instant case, the commission's find-
ings are supported by substantial evidence and should be 
affirmed. 
One issue that runs throughout the discussion of the spe-
cific evidentiary facts in this case is the question of the 
consideration, if any, to be given the present services pro-
vided by Spreader under its lease with Matlack. Where equip-
ment is leased to an authorized carrier, as is the arrangement 
between Spreader and Matlack, the services provided by the 
authorized carrier using that equipment constitute part of the 
existing transportation facilities. Utah Admin. Regs. 
§ A67-05-90. This is because the certificated carrier is by 
law providing the services, and presumably would use another 
means to provide the services if the lease were to end. In the 
instant case, the commission applied this rule, reasoning that 
a contrary rule would jeopardize the practice of leasing and 
would create a regulatory loophole. (R. 1502.) 
Much of the evidence supporting the commission's findings 
in this case has been described above. Accordingly, Hatch will 
deal here only with those specific factual contentions raised 
in Spreader's brief. 
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A. Adequacy of Existing Asphalt Transportation 
Facilities. 
Spreader first asserts that the existing asphalt trans-
portation facilities are inadequate to meet periods of peak 
demand. Spreader supports this contention with a capsulization 
of the testimony of several witnesses. The record demon-
strates, however, that on cross examination each of those 
witnesses made concessions which undercut Spreader's con-
clusion, and which showed only a general desire for additional 
carriers, rather than a genuine inadequacy in existing ser-
vices. Lake Shore Motor Coach Lines, Inc. v. Bennett, 8 Utah 
2d 293, 333 P.2d 1061, 1063 (1958). Because of those conces-
sions, the commission concluded that the witnesses had either 
not taken advantage of the available services or had not 
experienced failures significant enough to justify granting of 
the application. 
Spreader asserts that District 5 of the Utah Department of 
Transportation has experienced equipment availability prob-
lems. The witness, however, admitted that the District's 
transportation needs were decreasing, from 16 loads in 1983 to 
12 loads in 1984. (R. 128-29.) The witness also conceded that 
the District has not used the services of Hatch or Clark 
(R. 133-36), and that there had been no equipment shortages for 
two years. (R. 148-49.) 
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The representative of Koch Asphalt, who Spreader claims 
testified to an inadequate equipment supply, also testified 
that he saw no advantage, in terms of service, to granting 
authority to Spreader. (R. 160-64, 173.) He also testified 
that he had experienced only minor problems with the carriers 
he had used, including such problems with Spreader. (Id.) 
The representative of Staker Paving and Construction gave 
similar testimony. He testified that he had no real com-
plaints. In fact, he testified that, on one occasion, he had a 
job, which had been scheduled for two days, run into an 
unexpected third day. Clark was unable to provide equipment 
into the third day, because it was then committed elsewhere. 
On extremely short notice, Hatch was able to satisfy the 
witness* needs. (R. 204, 930.) 
Spreader next cites the testimony of representatives of 
Jack B. Parson Companies and Fife Rock Products. Those wit-
nesses both admitted that existing service was satisfactory and 
that they had not used all available carriers. (R. 338, 
360-61, 364.) Indeed, the representative of Fife testified 
that his company had no need for certificated carrier service 
of the type covered by the application at all during 1984. 
(R. 355.) 
Spreader asserts that its next supporting carrier, Asphalt 
Systems, uses the services of Clark, and that Clark is late 80% 
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of the time. The witness disclosed on cross examination, how-
ever, that his company, by prearrangement with Clark, uses 
Clark on a "carrier's convenience" basis, and in exchange for 
this concession, Clark charges the company a discounted rate. 
(R. 388.) This witness also testified that the company has not 
used other available carriers. (R. 389, 396.) 
The representatives of Logan City and Box Elder County, 
also cited by Spreader, testified that they had not used the 
services of all the available carriers. (R. 536, 608-09.) 
Further, the representative of Box Elder County testified that 
existing services were satisfactory. (R. 609, 611, 613.) 
The final witness Spreader cites in support of its claim 
that asphalt transportation services are inadequate testified 
that he had no personal knowledge of the adequacy of service 
(R. 566) and that demand for asphalt was down 20% statewide in 
1984. (R. 573-74.) 
All of this evidence led the commission to a logical con-
clusion. Although the witnesses testified that they would like 
to see more equipment available, such extra capacity, which 
would only be needed in instances of extraordinary demand, 
would only exacerbate an already serious problem with idle 
equipment. The testimony of the asphalt shippers falls within 
the confines of the court's decision in Lake Shore Motor Coach 
Lines, Inc. v. Bennett, 8 Utah 2d 293, 333 P.2d 1061 (1958), 
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that a showing by the applicant of a general desire for more 
equipment availability is insufficient to meet the applicant's 
burden of showing that additional equipment would enhance 
existing services. 333 P.2d at 1063. 
B. Adequacy of Existing Crude Petroleum Trans-
portation Facilities. 
Spreader's next assertion is that the existing crude oil 
transportation facilities are inadequate. The commission found 
that existing facilities were adequate, and its decision is 
based on substantial evidence. 
Spreader cites in detail the testimony of Larry Mouton, of 
Amoco, whom Spreader maintains is dissatisfied with existing 
services. The evidence, however, demonstrated that Mouton 
required trucks on 12 to 20 hours notice, usually on weekends 
when his own proprietary fleet was unable to procure drivers. 
(R. 672-73, 677-78.) He demands that the carriers have excess 
fleet and standby personnel on hand at all times, waiting for a 
call that may or may not come, at whatever the cost may be to 
the carriers. (R. 677-79.) In order to resolve this problem, 
the carriers have offered to dedicate equipment to Amoco, but 
Amoco refuses that arrangement. (R. 679, 1049.) While 
Spreader attempts to label Amoco as merely a "tough customer," 
the evidence supports the commission's conclusion that the 
demands of Amoco were in fact unreasonable. (R. 1496.) Two 
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other shippers described Amoco•s demands as unreasonable. 
(R. 521-22, 839-40.) 
The testimony of Chevron representatives was also not as 
critical of existing services as Spreader asserts. Although 
one Chevron representative (Taylor) testified that he felt the 
services of common carriers in Utah were "a little below aver-
age" (R. 492), he admitted several times on cross examination 
that service was satisfactory. (R. 496, 497, 501-02.) Another 
Chevron witness also testified that existing service was satis-
factory and responsive. (R. 521-23.) 
Most of Chevron's problems related to hauling of crude oil 
from wells in the Uintah Basin during the winter when the pipe-
line unexpectedly shuts down. (R. 506.) Those hauls, however, 
are on an emergency basis, often with only two hours notice. 
(R. 506, 520-23.) The witness testified that he did not expect 
the carriers to maintain excess equipment capacity to handle 
these unpredictable emergencies. (R. 520-21.) With respect to 
the Uintah Basin situation, the witness characterized the 
existing carriers as cooperative and responsive. (R. 521-23.) 
Other than the Uintah Basin situation, this witness character-
ized the services of the existing carriers as "excellent." 
(R. 520.) 
Based on this evidence, the commission correctly found that 
the existing facilities for transportation of crude oil are 
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adequate and responsive. (R. 1494-96.) The finding is sup-
ported by substantial evidence, is not unreasonable or irra-
tional, and should be affirmed. 
C. Adequacy of Existing Transportation Facili-
ties for Refined Petroleum Products. 
Spreader also argues that the facilities for transportation 
of refined products ("distillates") must be found inadequate as 
a matter of law. The evidence here, as elsewhere, was con-
flicting. The commission resolved the evidentiary issues 
against Spreader, and that resolution was based on substantial 
evidence. 
Spreader contends that Chevron found existing services to 
be inadequate. With regard to late deliveries, the Chevron 
representative admitted that the carriers were often called on 
three or fewer hours notice. (R. 1185, 1193.) Certainly, car-
riers should not be required to keep idle equipment available 
to respond to such demands at all times without delay. 
Spreader also asserts that Chevron complained of numerous 
service failures with existing carriers. The evidence was, 
however, that during the period in question, carriers had 
handled 2700 loads for Chevron. Of those loads, Energy Express 
experienced four failures, Matlack experienced two and Clark 
experienced none. (R. 496, 1189, 1191-92; Ex. 18-20.) The 
commission found the failure rate to be less than 2% and that 
such rate was acceptable. (R. 1494.) 
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The other shipper Spreader cites as having complaints 
regarding distillate transportation is Amoco. The Amoco rep-
resentative testified, however, that Amoco1s concern was with 
crude oil transportation, not distillate transportation. 
(R. 667-68.) This witness admitted that distillate trans-
portation services were satisfactory. (R. 630, 667-68.) 
The evidence regarding distillate transportation is that 
existing services are adequate and satisfactory. The commis-
sion's resolution of this issue was appropriate and should be 
affirmed. 
D. Projected Growth in the Utah Asphalt Indus-
try. 
Spreader next contends that the commission should have 
found that projected growth in the Utah asphalt industry justi-
fied granting of the application. The commission found: 
Applicant presented some evidence intended to 
indicate a prospective growth in the markets involved. 
In the case of asphalt hauls, the evidence indicates a 
market decline, since the major sources of asphalt now 
appear to exist out of state in contrast with the 
situation a few years ago. Giving the Applicant the 
maximum benefit of its evidence on growth, the growth 
indicated appears insufficient to justify by itself 
the granting of the application. (R. 1499.) 
The evidence supports the commission's conclusion. At the 
outset, it is appropriate to note that the growth projections 
cited in Spreader's brief are for usage of asphalt from all 
sources, and are not restricted to intrastate sources. 
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Spreader's application, however, only involves transportation 
from sources within the state. Most of the Utah refineries no 
longer produce asphalt. (R. 437, 683.) The only current 
manufacturer of asphalt in Utah is Phillips. (R. 64-66). All 
other asphalt is shipped into the state from out-of-state 
sources; these interstate shipments are not within the scope of 
the commission's regulatory powers, and Spreader already has 
the requisite interstate operating authority. (Ex. 3). 
A review of the shipper testimony indicates some growth 
projected by some of the shippers (R. 166, 317), little or no 
change in growth by some of the others (R. 166), and a decline 
in growth by others. (R. 355, 378, 573-74.) When the relative 
size of the various shippers is considered (for example, a 15 
to 20% decline for the Department of Transportation (R. 129, 
573-74), viewed as a whole as against a 25% growth factor 
projected by Parsons Asphalt (R. 317)), the comparison results 
in no net growth. Spreader's own witness indicated that, in 
his view, the average rate of growth in shipping was 5%. 
(R. 1254.) 
The commission also had before it evidence that the exist-
ing shippers had excess equipment capacity. (Ex. 63-65.) 
Given the evidence before the commission, its determination 
that growth was minimal and did not justify granting the appli-
cation was supported by the evidence and should be affirmed. 
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E. Projected Growth in Crude Oil Transportation 
Needs. 
Spreader next contends that projected growth in the trans-
portation of crude oil justified the granting of its applica-
tion. Spreader only cites two witnesses for this contention. 
One indicated that he anticipated an 8% growth rate over the 
next two years. The other was in the depressed shale oil busi-
ness, and his anticipation of growth was highly speculative. 
The commission also had before it evidence that the exist-
ing carriers had substantial excess capacity in this area. 
Hatch, for example, consistently had idle equipment available 
for the transportation of crude. (Ex. 62.) The decision 
whether to allow a new carrier to take new business, or whether 
to allow existing carriers to handle it, is within the exclu-
sive policy-making authority of the commission. This court has 
stated: 
Having found now that the convenience and necessity of 
the public in the territory proposed to be served, 
require additional service . . . the question is: 
Should such new service be rendered by existing car-
riers or by the new applicant? This question poses 
for the commission, not the finding of a factual 
answer, but the determination of a matter of policy. 
Which in the opinion of the commission will best sub-
serve the public convenience, necessity and welfare? 
Mulcahy v. Public Service Commission, 101 Utah 245, 117 P.2d 
298, 305 (1941). In this case, the commission determined that 
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existing carriers could and should handle any growth, par-
ticularly since the existing carriers had idle equipment 
available. The court should not overrule that policy choice. 
F. Projected Growth in Refined Product Trans-
portation Needs. 
Spreader's contention concerning projected growth in 
refined product transportation is subject to the same rule 
described above. The evidence Spreader cites is general in its 
terms and does not quantify the level of expected growth. Only 
one witness quantified the projection, indicating a modest 
growth rate of 7%. The commission acted within its sound 
discretion in determining that existing carriers could and 
should handle that increase if it materialized. 
G. Summary of Evidentiary Argument. 
In summary, the evidentiary argument Spreader presents in 
its brief amounts to a reargument of factual disputes already 
argued to and resolved by the commission. The existence of 
evidence which, if unrebutted, could have supported the appli-
cation does not require that the commission's decision be over-
turned. Taken as a whole, the commission's decision is a 
reasonable and rational resolution of the policy issues before 
it, and should be affirmed. 
Spreader's witnesses really had no substantial problems 
with the adequacy of existing services. Time after time, the 
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shipper witnesses conceded that their real concern was simply 
having as many choices as possible available to them. This 
court set to rest the contention that such general desires 
could support an application for authority nearly 30 years ag 
in Lake Shore Motor Coach Lines, Inc. v. Bennett/ 8 Utah 2d 
293, 333 P.2d 1061 (1958): 
Proving that public convenience and necessity would be 
served by granting additional carrier authority means 
something more than showing the mere generality that 
some members of the public would like and on occasion 
use such type of transportation service. . . . Our 
understanding of the statute is that there should be a 
showing that existing services are in some measure 
inadequate, or that public need as to the potential of 
business is such that there is some reasonable basis 
in the evidence to believe that public convenience and 
necessity justify the additional proposed service. 
333 P.2d at 1063 (footnote omitted). 
CONCLUSION 
The decision of the public service commission in this cas 
is supported by substantial evidence and is well-reasoned. I 
represents a fair and just resolution of policy decisions 
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within the exclusive jurisdiction of the commission. Accord-
ingly, the decision of the commission should be affirmed. 
DATED this Z/£- day of April, 1986. 
SNOW, CHRISTENSEN & MARTINEAU 
Rodney 
Attorneys for Protestant W. S 
Hatch Company 
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